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For 15 Years I Executed for Customers. Now I'm Executing for Maaya.
I spent fifteen years being an excellent Chief Product Officer and a passable everything-else-officer. The business grew anyway, because the product-and-delivery pillars were strong enough to hold up the ones I was ignoring. That is not a strategy. That is gravity, and it runs out.
For fifteen years I have built Maaya the way I build software. Solve the customer's problem, deliver the work, let the next customer find me through the last one. It worked. We grew to 453 customers across 13 countries without a marketing function, without paid advertising, without a content calendar, without a systematic presence on LinkedIn. A company built on the strength of the work, spreading on the credibility of the work.
What I did not notice, until recently, is that the model built to serve customers was also building a company that could not be found by the customers it was now best equipped to serve.
This post is about that gap. It is also, more honestly, about the moment a founder has to look at his own company the way he has spent his career looking at other people's companies — as a wheel with multiple spokes, all of which need to carry weight, not a sprint race where the strongest spoke wins. If you are a founder whose technical or operational depth has carried your business this far, this post may be for you. It was certainly for me.
A wheel is not one spoke
When I describe what a business actually is to someone earlier in the founder arc than me, I usually draw the same picture. A business is not one thing. It is a wheel, and a wheel has several spokes — product, delivery, marketing, sales, finance, team, strategy — all of which have to carry weight for the wheel to turn smoothly. If one spoke is thick and six are thin, the wheel still rolls. It just wobbles. And one day it wobbles into a pothole and you find out which spokes you never built.
For fifteen years, I built two of those spokes with my full attention.
Product became a deep, customizable enterprise ERP plus five vertical platforms — the Pi Family — because I put the hours in there. Delivery became a 90-day implementation model with named consultants, because I put the hours in there too. Both of those spokes are strong. Both are why we have 453 customers across 13 countries. Both are why this company survived fifteen years that most enterprise software companies do not survive.
The other five spokes developed by default.
Marketing was my personal network and customer referrals. That works when you know everyone in your addressable market. It does not work when the portfolio is six products and the buyers now researching ERP start on a search engine, not through a phone call. Sales was me — every meaningful engagement across the full history of the company had my name on it, which was possible when we closed fifteen to thirty customers a year and I had the calendar slack to meet each of them. Finance was conservative, debt-free, and funded out of revenue — a genuine strength I am not walking away from, but also a finance function that was not planning for the growth capital, working capital, and platform investments a vertical SaaS strategy actually requires. Team and strategy were founder-held. Ramalakshmi has been co-founder and director from day one. Her role has always been deliberately non-operational; the active execution across all five weak spokes rested on me. Which is to say: rested on nothing systematic.
The honest admission is this: I spent fifteen years being an excellent Chief Product Officer and a passable everything-else-officer. The business survived and grew because the two strong spokes were strong enough to hold the other five up. That is not a strategy. That is gravity, and it runs out.
The conversation that named it
I had heard some version of this observation, from advisors and customers, for at least three years. Multiple people had pointed at the wobble. I had taken the point, nodded, gone back to the work — the product work, always the product work — and done nothing structural about it.
What changed was a gradual consulting engagement with Rajiv Talreja across 2022 and 2023.
Two things he said landed and stayed.
The first was a sentence so simple that I resisted it for weeks: "Best known will beat the best." You can have the best product in the category. You can have the deepest customization, the most experienced consultants, the strongest customer outcomes. If the buyers in your market do not know you exist, the vendor they do know will win the deal. Quality is not visibility. I had been confusing the two for most of Maaya's history.
The second was equally blunt: "People fail, but systems never." Meaning: if your company depends on one person showing up, your company is one bad day away from stalling. If your company runs on a system that functions whether or not any specific person is in the room that day, the company is compounding. I had built a product that was genuinely a system. I had built a company that depended heavily on me.
What I could not push back on, once I sat with both statements for a while, was that I had accepted these truths intellectually for years and had not acted on them operationally. I would agree when an advisor raised the point. I would fall back into product work the next week. The gap between recognising a problem and building a system to solve it — that gap is where most founders like me live for most of our careers.
I started working on systems for the other five spokes of the wheel quietly in 2023 and through 2024. Not everywhere at once. Finance first, because debt-free without a growth plan was a liability. Team and strategy next, because decisions I was making alone needed structure. Sales and marketing last — because marketing is the hardest of the five for a technocrat founder to accept as real work, and I had to accept several other restructurings before I could accept that one.
This post is the public surface of that last acceptance.
Why it took until now
If the conversation with Rajiv happened in 2022 and 2023, a fair question is: why is the marketing restart happening in 2026? The honest answer has three parts — one about the portfolio, one about the economics, and one about the category. Each shift alone would not have been enough. All three together made avoidance impossible.
The first shift was in the portfolio itself. In 2023, the Pi Family was still principally MaayaERP plus one or two vertical platforms in early form. Today it is six — MaayaERP, PoultryCare, RestoPi, FeedPi, StratoPi, and LivMatrix — with a seventh in development for textile manufacturing. This is no longer a product-marketing problem. It is a portfolio-marketing problem. A serious buyer evaluating RestoPi investigates the parent company. A talented engineer evaluating Maaya as an employer investigates what the company actually builds. A partner evaluating Maaya for AWS Marketplace co-marketing investigates the scale. All three investigations currently happen on a website and a set of surfaces that under-represents what Maaya actually is. That gap is now expensive.
The second shift was in the economics of content itself. For most of Maaya's fifteen years, marketing at our deal size — premium enterprise implementations in the tens to low hundreds of thousands of dollars — was not obviously economic. A traditional marketing function with content writers, designers, SEO specialists, and a demand generation team costs more than the revenue uplift it produces when you sell fifteen to thirty customers a year. The math did not work, and I used that as justification for the avoidance.
The math has changed. With a disciplined AI-augmented content operation — founder voice captured and codified, patterns standardised, drafts generated and edited rather than written from scratch, compliance checks automated against the brand guide — a single founder plus a part-time operator can run a content function that a full team used to run. In practice this looks like forty-five minutes of founder time a day. A voice memo in the morning becomes three draft variants by mid-morning. A review at midday approves one. A content bank of four to eight drafts stays queued ahead of the publishing calendar. Quality compliance runs as an automated check before any draft reaches me. None of this is free, and none of it is set-and-forget, but it is roughly one-fifth the cost and one-fifth the time of the marketing operation it replaces. Most enterprise software founders running premium-services businesses have not caught up to this shift yet, which means there is a window.
The third shift, and the one that finally forced the decision, was in the category's competitive dynamics. Fifteen years ago, a mid-market Indian manufacturer evaluating ERP started with a phone call to a friend who had implemented SAP or Tally. Today, the same manufacturer starts with a search query, spends two weeks on comparison articles and industry threads, and arrives at the first vendor call with a pre-formed opinion about which options are viable. Odoo has a content operation that is better than SAP's. NetSuite has entered consideration sets in markets it is not especially well suited to, because it has a marketing engine. If the most serious product in the category is invisible at the search-and-research stage, the most serious product loses the evaluation before it is in the room. I have seen this pattern for three years now. In 2026 it became undeniable.
Those three shifts — portfolio, economics, category — are what moved this restart from something I should do to something I am doing.
What restarting actually looks like
Restarting marketing after fifteen years is not the same as starting marketing from zero. Maaya is not a new company looking for its first customers. It is a mature company with a portfolio, a reputation, a customer base, and a founder who has a strong point of view on enterprise software. What we are doing is making that visible, systematically, to the audiences who cannot currently find us.
Concretely, over the next ninety days, the active engine produces two LinkedIn posts a week from my personal account, amplified by Maaya's company page through a disciplined reshare protocol. One long-form essay per month lives on the Maaya blog — the kind of writing you are reading right now. Four MaayaERP case studies go live with real customer outcomes and real numbers. Four comparison pages answer the searches buyers actually run: MaayaERP versus NetSuite, versus SAP Business One, versus Odoo, versus ERPNext. A pricing page goes live, because serious buyers want to self-qualify and a site without a pricing surface signals we are not serious about transparency. An outbound motion begins the quarter after, targeting the specific ICPs the portfolio is built to serve. Roughly 25 founder-authored posts over ninety days is 2.3 posts per week, which is the rhythm Rajiv's systems thinking would recognise as consistent enough to compound, restrained enough to sustain.
None of this is new practice. All of it is standard enterprise B2B marketing. What makes it worth a founder post is that I avoided doing it for the company's entire history, the avoidance was deliberate, and the reasons for the deliberate avoidance no longer hold.
What this is not
Let me be direct about what this restart is not, because the alternative reads as dishonest.
This is not a growth hack. I am not chasing a scale story. MaayaERP's target for the year is three to five right-fit premium engagements, not three hundred. The vertical platforms have different targets appropriate to their product-led motions. I am not restarting marketing because I have suddenly discovered that scale is good. I am restarting marketing because the portfolio's existing quality is not translating into the awareness it should, and the people we want to work with cannot find us.
This is not a rebrand. The Maaya brand, the Pi Family architecture, the evidence-first voice — these were thoughtfully built last year and they hold up. The restart runs on the brand that exists.
This is not a pivot to product-led growth. MaayaERP is and will remain a services-led, implementation-heavy, premium-priced enterprise platform. The vertical platforms are closer to product-led motions, but even they are not the kind of self-serve SaaS where marketing replaces sales. Marketing at Maaya makes the right prospects aware, qualified, and conversation-ready. Sales and delivery still do the rest.
This is not an outsourced effort. The founder voice stays the founder's. The AI stack generates drafts; I read them, edit them, approve them. If any of the posts over the next ninety days reads like generic agency output, the restart has failed — and the fix is mine to make.
The mirror
I said at the top of this post that the gap I discovered was not just about marketing. It was about looking at my own company the way I have spent fifteen years looking at other people's companies. A wheel with spokes, all of which must carry weight.
This is also, not incidentally, the principle Maaya encodes into the software we build. Systems thinking — the belief that a business is a set of interconnected processes, that efficiency is an asymptote you approach through structure rather than an outcome you produce through effort, that the right software is the one that reflects how the whole business actually works rather than optimising one function at the expense of the others — informs how we design every product in the Pi Family. It is why MaayaERP ships customization during implementation rather than after. It is why our vertical platforms absorb the deep operational reality of their industries rather than imposing a generic workflow. It is, in a word, what Maaya does.
Which is why this post is also a mirror.
If you are a founder whose product excellence, engineering depth, or operational mastery has carried your business this far — and you look at your own company and realise your wheel has a thick spoke and six thin ones — you are recognising the same pattern I spent fifteen years avoiding. The business is still running. The strongest spoke is still pulling weight. But the wobble is there, and you know it.
The fix is not another round of doubling down on the spoke that is already thick. The fix is building systems for the spokes that are thin, one at a time, in the order your business actually needs them. For me, that journey started with finance, moved through team and strategy, and is ending — publicly, with this post — at marketing. For your business the order will be different. The principle is the same: the company you built has a shape, and the shape has gaps, and the gaps will eventually cost you.
This restart is step one of mine. Maaya at fifteen is where I want it to be on product and delivery. Maaya at thirty is where I want it to be on the other five spokes too. And the software Maaya builds is, in part, an attempt to give other founders the systems layer I took too long to build for myself.
Next step
If you are a founder who recognises yourself in the wheel-with-thin-spokes description — if you know which part of your business is pulling weight and which parts are quietly being held up by gravity — the next year of Founder Series essays is written for you. Each one is a system-building perspective on one part of the wheel, from someone who learned each lesson late.
Subscribe to the Founder Series to follow the next ninety days of this restart as they unfold. If your business is at the stage where the thin spoke is your software — where the operational reality of your company has outgrown the systems that used to track it — book a conversation and we can talk about what a proper assessment looks like.
Sources and citations
- Rajiv Talreja consulting engagement (2022–2023) — Direct engagement between Janagaran and business coach Rajiv Talreja. The two quoted principles are from his broader body of work on systems thinking for SMBs. More at rajivtalreja.com
- 453 customers, 13 countries, 15 years; Pi Family of six products plus TexoPi in development — Maaya internal records as of April 2026
- Competitive observations on Odoo, SAP, and NetSuite — Author's pattern recognition from 15 years of ERP evaluation cycles, not third-party benchmarks
- AI-augmented content economics (~45 min/day, ~1/5 cost) — Maaya's measured internal numbers from the Q1 2026 restart, not industry averages
- Shift in B2B buyer research behaviour — Consistent with Gartner and Forrester findings that B2B buyers now complete the majority of their research before contacting sales
